A New Question in the Sandpapergate File: Khawaja’s Claim and Lehmann’s Memory

Cape Town, March 2026: after cameras caught Cameron Bancroft attempting to alter the ball’s condition, Australian cricket presented a clear picture of responsibility—suspensions for several players, head coach Darren Lehmann’s resignation and an investigation by Cricket Australia. Usman Khawaja has now added an uncomfortable older claim to that picture. In excerpts published to promote his autobiography, Sabr, Khawaja said the attempt to tamper with the ball was not confined to Cape Town; in his account, it had also been tried in the previous Test. Lehmann says he does not remember a discussion about collective responsibility within the team. The central question is no longer what happened in Cape Town—that is part of the record—but who in the team knew what before it happened.

Context: One incident, two ideas of accountability

During Australia’s 2026 tour of South Africa, the Cape Town Test brought both the condition of the cricket ball and dressing-room accountability into public view. Bancroft was filmed using sandpaper on the ball. The roles of captain Steve Smith and vice-captain David Warner emerged, and Cricket Australia imposed bans of different lengths on the three players. Lehmann, then head coach, left his post soon afterwards. The inquiry’s findings did not regard him as directly involved or as having prior knowledge.

This was a particular kind of Test-cricket incident. Altering the condition of an older ball can be an attempt to generate reverse swing; here, however, the technical value of the tactic matters less than the rules and the team culture. The available information gives no details of a specific over, innings, bowler or tactical decision. It would therefore be wrong to turn this into an assessment of an individual’s performance or the course of the match. It is primarily a question about integrity, leadership and the limits of an investigation.

According to excerpts from Khawaja’s autobiography published by the Sydney Morning Herald, he said attempts to tamper with the ball occurred in both the Cape Town Test and the Test before it. He also said that after Bancroft was caught, he argued for collective responsibility: “It was all of us. Not the batters, not the bowlers, not the staff. All of us.” This is not a claim about an individual’s technique or a statistical record. It is an interpretation of the team’s shared environment and responsibility.

The central question: What does ‘everyone knew’ mean?

On ABC Sport’s Summer Grandstand, Lehmann said he did not remember a discussion about collective responsibility: “I don’t remember that.” He also set out the limits of his account: “I can only speak to what I know.” These statements are not the same kind of evidence. Khawaja is describing conversations and culture within the team; Lehmann is speaking about his memory and the limits of his knowledge. Treating them as straightforward, direct contradictions risks shrinking the question instead of clarifying it.

Lehmann also said that ball-tampering had existed in cricket for about 150 years. His point may be that knowing such conduct exists in general is different from knowing about a specific plan or incident in advance. That distinction sits at the heart of the dispute. Historical examples of efforts to alter the ball, if they exist, do not excuse what happened in 2026; nor does general awareness of a practice prove that a coach knew about a particular attempt.

In my years of watching matches and reading the layers of teams from age-group cricket to Test level, the most important documents in stories like this are often the ones that were never broadcast: meeting records, messages, timelines or a witness’s specific account. The public material available so far consists of Khawaja’s claim and Lehmann’s memory-based response; no decisive document has been presented between them. The previous Test should also be named cautiously. The tour sequence makes the second Test at Port Elizabeth a possible reference, but the available account does not confirm it.

The key to understanding Sandpapergate is not only who held the sandpaper; it is also how the team divided responsibility among individuals, leadership and collective culture. Cricket Australia’s disciplinary action imposed different bans according to the players’ individual roles. Khawaja’s wording challenges that division: in his view, responsibility at the time did not end with those named in the investigation and sanctions. That is a genuine tension between his account and the official findings, but tension alone is not proof that another person was involved.

The contrarian angle: resignation is not an answer, and memory is not a verdict

Lehmann’s departure is often presented as the final chapter in the story. But a resignation is neither an admission of wrongdoing nor proof that a coach knew everything. Likewise, the finding that he was not directly involved or aware in advance does not prove that every dressing-room conversation and cultural signal fell fully within the inquiry’s scope. These points need to be kept separate. The institutional finding can be respected while its limits are still examined.

Lehmann has described that period as extremely difficult. He said he spent about four months in a “really dark place” and did not leave his house. He also expressed sympathy for the families and people involved, because renewed debate could take them back to a painful period. These remarks should not be treated as a reason to dismiss the dispute or as confirmation of either account. They show the human cost of public accountability, when old allegations return and every response is read as either blame or defence.

Lehmann questioned the timing of Khawaja’s account, saying that bringing it up eight years later while selling a book was different. That criticism draws attention to the promotional context, but it does not make the claim false by itself. Conversely, coverage of the excerpts increases attention around the book, so readers should keep promotion and proof distinct. If the full autobiography contains more specific dates, conversations or eyewitness detail, the basis for examining the claim would change. The information available does not establish that such independent verification has emerged.

The most useful cross-check is straightforward: if Khawaja gave a more specific account of the conversation, who was present and what he personally witnessed, the claim would become more testable and stronger. If Lehmann were shown the date, agenda or messages from a meeting and responded to those specifics, the limits of his memory could also be assessed more carefully. At present, neither public statement alone establishes what the entire dressing room knew. Declaring that a practice existed across the tour on the basis of one incident would also go beyond the evidence provided.

This is where cricket’s institution and cricket’s culture take different paths. A board needs specific roles and available evidence to determine sanctions. Players, by contrast, sometimes describe the pressure or acceptance that may have become normal before a rules breach occurred. One framework asks: who did it, who instructed it, and who knew? The other asks: how did the team make room for it? Both questions are legitimate, but their answers will not necessarily come from the same document. Scouting is archaeology with a deadline and a smaller budget; an inquiry into team culture must uncover its buried layers with the same patience.

What should come next?

For now, this is a dispute between Khawaja’s recollection and Lehmann’s memory, not a new official finding. The greatest risk is reducing a complex institutional question to a personal feud between two people. If Sabr contains specific, verifiable details, there may be calls to reconsider Cricket Australia’s earlier findings in light of new information. If it does not, the argument will not be settled by a slogan; it will depend on who saw what, when it was reported and which records can confirm it.

The signal for readers is clear: look beyond promotional excerpts for dates, conversations and independent corroboration. A claim made eight years later is not automatically less credible, but a late claim deserves the same scrutiny as the investigation conducted at the time. The next layer will be opened not by a sharper statement, but by evidence showing what was actually said in the team room before Cape Town.